Background[ edit ] In the Furman v. Georgia case, the resident awoke in the middle of the night to find William Henry Furman committing burglary in his house. At trial, in an unsworn statement allowed under Georgia criminal procedure, Furman said that while trying to escape, he tripped and the weapon he was carrying fired accidentally, killing the victim.
The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession.
The police did not effectively advise him of his right to Georgia v furman case note silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed.
During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him.
At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible.
This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions.
We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings.
We have undertaken a thorough reexamination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution -- that "No person.
These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured "for ages to come, and. Over 70 years ago, our predecessors on this Court eloquently stated: The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not uncommon even in England.
While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the [p] questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.
The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand.
But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.
In stating the obligation of the judiciary to apply these constitutional rights, this Court declared in Weems v. United States, U. Under any other rule, a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas.
Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. The [p] meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction.
This was the spirit in which we delineated, in meaningful language, the manner in which the constitutional rights of the individual could be enforced against overzealous police practices. It was necessary in Escobedo, as here, to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not become but a "form of words," Silverthorne Lumber Co.
And it is in this spirit, consistent with our role as judges, that we adhere to the principles of Escobedo today.
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow, but, briefly stated, it is this: By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.Table of Cases - This table does not include all cases cited in the journal, rather those which have been the subject of a case note or where there has been a substantial reference to fact, argument or the law in an article.
Coker v. Georgia, U.S. (), held that the death penalty for rape of an adult woman was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.A few states continued to have child rape statutes that authorized the death penalty.
In Kennedy rutadeltambor.comana (), the court expanded Coker, ruling that. in the constitutional court of south africa. case no: cct/20/94 in the matter of: the state versus henry williams jonathan koopman tommy mampa gareth papier. State of Connecticut v.
Michael Skakel. S.C. SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Judicial District of Fairfield. STATE OF CONNECTICUT VS. The following items have been extracted from The Early Records of Georgia, Volume II, Wilkes County abstracted and compiled by Grace Gillam Davidson, published in at Macon, GA NOTE: "End of Page" notations refer to the page numbers of the original () Mrs.
Davidson book. FURMAN V. GEORGIA In the history of Georgia, as well as in the rest of the United States, execution, or what is better known as the death penalty, was the result of a defendant found guilty in such crimes as murder and rutadeltambor.com , in the case of Furman rutadeltambor.coma the U.S.
Supreme Court placed a moratorium, which is a delay or suspension of an activity or law, on the sentencing of Furman.